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CHAPTER 4 
Workmen's Compensation 
LAURENCE S. LOCKE" 
§4.1. Introduction. In the Survey year of June 1, 1977, to May 31, 1978, 
the appellate courts of Massachusetts reviewed fourteen cases involving 
work-related injuries. Of these, one was a personal injury action at law 
against an employer who had not provided coverage !mder the Work-
men's Compensation Act, 1 four involved tort actions ag inst third parties 
for negligence resulting in a compensable injury,2 and nine were work-
men's compensation cases under chapter 152 of the General Laws.3 
Eight of the fourteen were decided by the Appeals Cour , including seven 
workmen's compensation cases 4 and one personal injury case.5 The 
other six were decided by the Supreme Judicial Court, including four of 
the five personal injury cases n and two compensation cases.7 Where the 
Industrial Accident Board had awarded compensation, the appellate court 
either upheld the award H or, in one case, recommitted for further find-
" LAURENCE S. LOCKE is a partner in the law firm f Petkun & Locke, 
Boston and is the author of the Massachusetts Practice Series v lume on workmen's 
compensation. 
§4.1. 1 Barrett v. Transformer Service, Inc., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 773, 374 
N .E.2d 1325. See § 4.5 infra. 
2 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 526, 373 N.E.2d 
957 ( § 4.3 illfra); Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 372 
N.E.2d 212 ( § 4.6 infra); Saharceski v. Macure, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1890, 366 
N.E.2d 1245; Bulpett v. Dodge Associates, Inc., 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
1000, 365 N.E.2d 1248 ( § 4.6 infra). 
~ Fitzgibbons' Case, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 675, 373, N.E.2d 1174 (§ 4.2 infra); 
Anderson's Case, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2581, 370 N.E.2d 692; Wajda's Case, 1978 
Mass. App. 0. Adv. Sh. 338, 374 N.E.2d 346; Casey's Case, 978 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. 287, 374 N.E.2d 332 ( § 4.4 infra); DaSilva's Case, 978 Mass. App. Ct. 
Adv. Sh. 83, .'372 N.E.2d 285; Gioiosa's Case, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1160, 
369 N.E.2d 730; Audette's Case, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. S . 1067, 367 N.E.2d 
865; Pena's Case, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 765, 363 N E.2d 1333; Bagge's 
Case, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 720, 363 N.E.2d 1321. 
4 Wajda's Case; Casey's Case; DaSilva's Case; Gioiosa's C se; Audette's Case; 
Pena's Case; Bagge's Case, note 3 supra. 
G Bulpett v. Dodge Associates, Inc., note 2 supra. 
6 See notes 1 and 2 supra. 
7 Fitzgibbons' Case; Anderson's Case, note 3 supra. 
H Fitzgibbons' Case; Casey's Case; DaSilva's Case; Gioiosa's Case; Audette's 
Case; Bagge's Case, note 3 supra. 
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ings.n In the two cases in which the Board had found for an insurer the 
courts recommitted for further findings. 1 0 The cases suggest a strong 
trend toward a broad and humane construction of the laws applicable to 
employees injured as a result of employment. 
The legislature during the 1978 session continued its recent progress in 
bringing compensation benefits more in line with current wage and price 
levels by doubling the benefits to survivors 11 and the amount allowed 
for funeral benefits. 1 ~ In a number of minor amendments, it clarified 
details of the law.13 
§4.2. Personal Injury Arising out of Employment: Suicide Resulting 
from Acute Psychotic Reaction to Dramatic Work Incident: Wear and 
Tear Distinguished."' The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had 
previously held that mental and nervous injuries are included within the 
concept of "personal injury" under the Massachusetts Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, 1 either when mental, emotional, and nervous disorders 
resulted from physical trauma,~ or when physical and organic disorders 
resulted from psychic trauma, such as nervous tension, fear, fright, 
excitement, or anxiety. 3 At last presented with a suitable case, the Court 
ruled that "the term 'personal injury' also permits compensation in cases 
involving mental disorders or disabilities casually connected to mental 
trauma or shock arising 'out of the employment looked at in any of its 
aspects.' " 4 In doing so, our Court has placed Massachusetts in line 
with the growing majority of jurisdictions.5 
9 Pena's Case, note 3 supra. 
10 Anderson's Case; Wajda's Case, note 3 supra. 
11 Acts of 1978, c. 461, applicable for injuries occurring after November l, 1978, 
§ 4.7 infra. 
12 Acts of 1978, c. 424, effective July 13, 1978, § 4.7 infra. 
13 See § 4.7 infra. 
" AUTHORS NOTE. The text of this article was written before the decision 
in Albanese's Case, 1979 :-.lass. Adv. Sh. 1171, 389 N.E.2cl 8.3. In that case, the 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld as a personal injury a mental breakdown caused 
by a series of specific stressful emotional episodes at work, but refused to recon-
sider the doctrine of wear and tear as it applies to mental injury cases. Albanese's 
Case will he the subject of further comment in the 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§4.:?. 1 G.L. c. 152. 
2 Lambert's Case, 364 Mass. 832, 304 N.E.2cl 428 (1973); Mclssac's Case, 266 
Mass. 67, 164 N.E. 653 ( 1929); Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N.E. 330 
(1924); Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915); Hunnewell's Case, 
220 Mass. 351, 107 N.E. 934 (1915). 
3 Baruffaldi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 337 Mass. 495, 150 
N.E.2d 269 (1958); Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954); Charon's 
Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 ( 1947). 
4 Fitzgibbons' Case, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 675, 681, 373 N.E.2d 1174, 1177, 
per Abrams, J. See prediction that the court would so hold in L. LocKE, WoRK-
MEN's CoMPENSATION, 29 Mass. Prac. § 196 at 235 n.82 (1968) (hereinafter cited 
2
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The employee, Fitzgibbons, was a supervisory corrections officer at the 
Billerica House of Correction. He ordered several ojcers to remove an 
inmate to a segregated area in an effort to quell an i mate disturbance. 
During the removal, a scuffie ensued. One officer b came ill, was dis-
patched to an infirmary and then to a hospital, where he was pronounced 
dead. On being informed of the officer's death, Fitzgilj>bons began to cry 
and became very shaky and upset. A diagnosis of acu~e anxiety reaction 
was made of Fitzgibbons. After the incident, he never worked again. 
He became withdrawn and talked mostly of the offi9er's death and his 
personal responsibility for it. Three weeks after th~ incident, he was 
found at home bleeding from the head due to a gunshot wound, from 
which he later died. 0 
The Industrial Accident Board, adopting the findlings of the single 
member, found that the employee became obsessed with guilt over his 
subordinate's death and as a result shot himself. The Board concluded: 
[T]he employee sustained a personal injury on Au~ust 24, 1973, as 
evidenced by his immediate emotional reaction following the dra-
matic incident at work .... As a result of said injury, i.e., psychotic 
depression, the employee committed suicide and ... I said suicide was 
the result of the employee being of 'such unsoundnJss of mind as to 
make him irresponsible for his act of suicide.' [G.L. c. 152 §26A).7 
On the insurer's appeal, the superior court entered a 'udgment affirming 
the decision of the Board. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an ap-
plication for direct appellate review. 
In deciding the case, the Court dealt first with thf self-insurer's con-
tention that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Board's finding 
of causal connection between the prison incident of August 24, 1973, and 
the employee's suicide. The Court considered this al case where expert 
testimony was required. The probative value of this testimony is to be 
weighed by the fact-finding tribunal, whose decision is to be accepted as 
final if supported by the evidence, including all rationf1l inferences which 
could be drawn therefrom.~ The Court held that it ~as within the prov-
ince of the Board to accept the medical testimony of the claimant's psy-
as LocKE) and Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law 1968 ArN. SURv. MAss. LAw 
§ 16.5 at 412. 
5 See 1A, A. LARSON, WoRKMEN's CmrPENSATION, § 4 .23 ( 1976); Larson, 
Mental and Nervous In;uries in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VANDERBILT L. REv. 
1243, 1260 (1970); Render, Mental Illness as an Industrial A!cident, 31 TENNESSEE 
L. REv. 288 (1968). 
o 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 676-77, 373 N.E.2d at 1175-7 . 
7 Id. at 677, 373 N.E.2d at 1176. 
8 Id. at 678, 373 N.E.2d at 1176. For this axiomatic proposition, the Court 
cited Foley's Case, 358 Mass. 230, 232, 263 N.E.2d 471, 47~ ( 1970) and Haley's 
Case, 356 Mass. 678, 680, 255 N .E.2d 322 ( 1970). 1 
I 
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chiatrist and discount that of the self-insurer's expert. The claimant's 
psychiatrist testified that the employee suffered from a psychotic depres-
sive reaction caused by the incident and that the psychotic depressive 
reaction was responsible for the unsoundness of mind that resulted in 
suicide. This evidence, the Court held, constituted more than the mere 
possibility or chance of the existence of a causal connection between the 
employee's work experience and conditionY The Court reasoned that the 
claimant's expert gave reasons for his opinion and explained that the 
employee's medical history and background were more consistent with a 
diagnosis of psychotic depressive reaction resulting from the prison inci-
dent than with a diagnosis of involutional melancholia, as the self-in-
surer's expert had suggested.10 
In dealing with the primary issue in the case, namely the self-insurer's 
contention that the term "personal injury" does not include mental or 
emotional disorders resulting from purely mental trauma or shock, the 
Court first observed, "Personal injury has been broadly defined to include 
'whatever lesion or change in any part of the system produces harm or 
pain or a lessened facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or 
capability.'" 11 The Court then reviewed the existing case law, under 
which the term "personal injury" has been held to include mental and 
nervous disorders arising out of employment where such injuries are the 
result of physical trauma, no matter how slight the impact.12 Addition-
ally, the Court noted that it is established that physical and organic dis-
orders resulting from mental trauma are compensable personal injuries 
where there is a causal relationship between the mental trauma, the 
physical or organic injury, and the employment.13 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that "there is no valid distinction which would preclude men-
tal or emotional disorders caused by mental or emotional trauma from 
being compensable." 14 
9 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 679, 373 N.E.2d at 1176. 
JO Id. The opinion of an expert may be phrased in terms of medical certainty 
or reasonable probability and still be construed by the court as amounting to little 
more than a guess, where the subordinate facts do not give adequate support to 
the conclusion reached and his opinion is not based upon a sound foundation. 
See LocKE, supra note 4, at § 521, esp. note 1 on 644. The cases cited include 
two suicide cases, Oberlander's Case, 348 Mass. 1, 200 N.E.2d 268 ( 1964) and 
Ruschetti's Case, 299 Mass. 426, 431, 13 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1938), making it nec-
essary for the Court to deal explicitly with this issue. 
n 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 680, 373 N.E.2d at 1177, citing Burn's Case, 218 
Mass. 8, 12, 105 N.E. 601, 603 (1914). 
12 See 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 680, 373 N.E.2d at 1177 and cases cited. See also 
LocKE, supra note 4, § 196 at 234 n.79 and Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
1968 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAw § 16.5 at 412, n.l. 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 280, 373 N.E.2d at 1177. See also LocKE, supra note 
4, § 196 at 234 n.80 and Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1968 ANN. SURv. 
MASs. LAw § 16.5 at 412, n.2. 
14 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 681, 373 N.E.2d at 1177. 
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The self-insurer argued to the Court that its decision in Begin's Case 11' 
foreclosed recovery. That case, previously discussed and criticized by 
this author,H1 held that the emotional disturbance sustained by an em-
ployee resulting from the stress of his employment ovf a three and one-
half year period was not a personal injury within the eaning of the Act. 
However, Begin's Case· relied on Maggelet's Casen an other cases which 
established the doctrine of wear and tear. As set f rth in Maggelet's 
Case, under that doctrine the "gradual breaking down or degeneration of 
tissues caused by long and laborious work is not the result of a personal 
injury within the meaning of the Act." 1 H The Court did not see Magge-
let's Case as controlling; the "wear and tear" doctrine was simply in-
applicable to Fitzgibbon's Case. Here, the Court noted, the claimant's 
expert testified that the injury-Fitzgibbon's psychotic depression reac-
tion-was caused by a single traumatic event. Th Court thus saw 
present a "mental injury resulting from a stress gre ter than the ordi-
nary stresses of. everyday work." 10 
The self-insurer also contended that since the injury was caused by the 
employee's unwarranted guilt feelings, the subjective 1 ature of these feel-
ings made claimant's reaction a "personal idiosyncracy," and not work-
related. The self-insurer was relying on Korsun's Case. 20 The Court 
minimized the significance of Koi'Slm's Case, stating that its holding there 
was based on a lack of evidence to connect the alleged precipitating 
events to the claimant's employment. The Court forthrightly said that 
"[t]he fact that the guilt feelings might be subjectiv,is insufficient ... 
since the event triggering the guilt feelings is the r levant criterion in 
determining whether the injury is compensable." ~ 1 t is submitted that 
by this comment the Court has effectively overrule any precedential 
value in Korsun's Case. 
The decision of the Court in Fitzgibbons' Case, though predictable, is 
of great significance. It places all personal injuries, whether physical or 
mental, on the same plane and eliminates the need to differentiate be-
tween them on the basis of mental or physical stimulus and mental or 
physical effect. Thus the decision should remove any hesitation that an 
JG 354 Mass. 594,238 N.E.2d 864 (1968). 
1G Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1968 ANN. SuR . MAss. LAw, § 16.5 
at 413-15. 
17 228 Mass. 57, 116 N .E. 972 ( 1917). 
lR ld. at 61, 116 N .E. at 97 4. 
1!l 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 682, 373 N.E.2d at 1177 . 
. 2u 354 Mass. 124, 128, 235 N.E.2d 814 ( 1968) (the mere unexplained presence 
of a whiskey bottle in an employee's desk, in a situation in which he was appre-
hensive over losing his job, held not to he a compensable personal injury, hut to 
have arisen from the common necessity of earning a living and a personal idio-
syncracy). 
21 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 683, 373 N.E.2d at 1178. 
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injured employee might previously have had to bringing a claim for com-
pensation where a mental or emotional trauma has caused a mental or 
emotional disability. It is still necessary, however, for the claimant to 
establish that an employment-related event or events caused, aggravated, 
or precipitated the mental or emotional disorder or disability. 
The decision does not, however, answer all questions concerning the 
legal treatment of mental disability caused by mental stimulus. Will the 
Court's use of the term "mental trauma or shock" be taken to imply that 
mental disability, to be compensable, must be caused by discrete, identi-
fied events, as distinct from protracted stress? Such an implication seems 
warranted from the language, particularly in light of th.e Court's reliance 
on the fact of a "single traumatic event" in Fitzgibbons' Case as the basis 
for distinguishing Begin's Case. 22 However, no comparable requirement 
exists for physical impairments under the J\Iassachusetts Act,2a and such 
a distinction would he inconsistent with the Court's broad statement of 
the comparability of physical and mental injury cases.24 
Several decisions in other jurisdictions have upheld the compensability 
of mental impairment brought on gradually hy strain or worry. The 
leading case is Carter v. General Motor Corp.,2u which involved strain 
and worry suffered by an assembly line worker who, unable to keep up 
with the line, found himself constantly berated hy his foreman, became 
filled with a dread of losing his job, and ended up with a disabling psy-
chosis. In American National Red Cross v. Hagen 2'; a Red Cross worker's 
acute schizophrenia reaction, paranoid type, was found to have been 
causally related to the stresses of his job, including his location in Japan, 
personnel problems, extra work during his superior's illness, and conflict 
with the local military chaplain over who was to advise servicemen of 
death in their families. In Butler v. District Parking Management Co.27 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld com-
pensation to a parking lot attendant who developed a schizophrenic reac-
tion after twenty years. In Yocom v. Piercc,2 x the Kentucky Supreme 
Court affirmed a compensation award for an employee who suffered a 
nervous breakdown while working on a production job for a clothing 
manufacturer. 
The prestigious New York Court of Appeals in a carefully reasoned and 
significant decision accepted the compensability of mental injuries result-
22 See text at note 19 supra. 
23 See Jarvis' Case, 274 Mass. 305, 174 N.E. 485 (1931) (back sprain during 
night's work); l\lill's Case, 258 Mass._ 475, 1.5.5 :\.E. 42:3 ( l!J27) (porter injurea 
froni heavy work over period of several months). 
24 1978 Mass. Aclv. Sh. at 680-81, 373 N.E.2d at 1177. 
25 361 Mich. 577, 580-81, 106 N.W.2d 105, 106-07 (1960). 
2G 327 F.2d 559, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1964). 
27 363 F.2d 682, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
28 534 S.W.2d 796, 798-99 (Ky. 1976). 
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ing from mental stress over a period of time.2n The claimant was secretary 
to the security director of a department store and was drawn more and 
more into her boss's problems as a confidante as he became increasingly 
agitated and withdrawn over the pressure of his w rk. The security 
director's condition continued to deteriorate and one day the secretary 
found him dead of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. he shot plunged 
tll.e claimant into a severe depression, which the Cou t of Appeals held 
compensable, declaring that "[t]here is nothing talismalic about physical 
impact." 30 Another significant case arose in Wiscons n. Swiss Colony 
v. Dept. of ILHR 31 involved a purchasing agent for a mail order cheese 
business who suffered a schizophrenic mental breakdown, which she at-
tributed to nervewracking seasonal business and harassment by her super-
visor. 
A second unanswered question in Fitzgibbons' Cla arises from the 
Court's stipulation of a standard of severity of mental c use, the standard 
being "stress greater than the ordinary stresses of veryday work." 3 !! 
Can this serve as a viable standard susceptible to co mon law applica-
tion and clarification, or is it so vague and unmeasur ble that it cannot 
serve as a legal guidepost? What is "everyday work?" What are its 
"ordinary stresses?" Indeed, that the Court would propose any standard 
at all is troubling. The proposition has long been axiomatic, with respect 
to physical injuries, that no physical trauma, however "ordinary'' or how-
ever "slight," is too ordinary or too slight to be barred as a matter of 
law from being considered the cause of a compensab~ disability. The 
issue in each case is simply whether the trauma did, in fact, cause the 
disabling impairment.a3 Thus, here again, the Court's specific language 
is inconsistent with its broad statement of principle, a d leaves applica-
tion of the decision problematical. 
It is submitted that if the mental stress producing the mental or emo-
tional breakdown can be attributed to any aspect of the claimant's em-
ployment 34 then a case of compensable mental or emotional disorder 
arises and should be treated no differently than a case of physical disor-
der. This accords with the broad view taken by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in a number of recent cases that have elimina ed distinctions in 
the law of personal injury previously erected on the asis of status and 
29 Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 36 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330 
N.E.2d 603 (1975). 
3o Id. at 510, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642, 330 N.E.2d at 606. 
31 72 Wis.2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976). 
32 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 682, 373 N.E.2d at 1177. See text at note 19 supra. 
33 Brzozowski's Case, 328 Mass. 113, 115, 102 N.E.2d 399, 400 (1951); McManus' 
Case, 328 Mass. 171, 173, 102 N.E.2d 401, 402 (1951); Madden's Case, 222 Mass. 
487, 493, 111 N.E. 379, 382 (1916). 
" Se, c~w•ll'• Co~, 305 M"'· 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328
1
330 (1940). 
7
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special fact patterns.35 Moreover, since the Court has emphasized that a 
physical injury resulting from prolonged physical exertion may constitute 
a personal injury under the Act,3G then it would be unseemly for the 
Court to erect a new distinction between physical and mental injuries, 
based upon the length of stress. 
How do we deal, then, with the "wear and tear" doCtrine? This author 
has frequently argued that this doctrine is an anomaly, a vestigial rem-
nant of the period of compensation jurisprudence when the courts re-
quired that an injury, to be said to have arisen out of the employment, 
must have resulted from a condition "peculiar to the employment." 37 In 
Caswell's Case, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the proper test is 
whether there is a causal relationship between the mental or physical 
injury and "the nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employ-
ment; in other words, out of the employment looked at in any of its 
aspects." 38 Thus, in determining whether a claimant's disability is the 
result of a personal injury arising out of the employment or is instead the 
result of "mere wear and tear," the question is primarily whether on 
the facts of the employment and the medical evidence on causal rela-
tionship, it can properly be found that the injury, whether mental or 
physical, is the result of a stress of the employment, or of the ordinary 
stresses of everyday life. 39 
It is highly desirable that the Supreme Judicial Court overrule expli-
citly the wear and tear doctrine. However, the concept of judicial parsi-
mony normally adopted by appellate tribunals in dealing with matters 
before it, namely to decide no issue broader than that required to dispose 
35 See Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 372 N.E.2d 212, 
where Justice Liacos, writing for the Court, stated: "Recent decisions of this 
court clearly reflect, however, a shift in philosophy with regard to status distinc-
tions in tort standards of care .... " Id. at 118, 372 N.E.2d at 224. Justice 
Liacos cited Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 ( 1973) which 
created a common law duty of reasonable care for an occupier toward all lawful 
visitors, abolishing the distinction between licensees and invitees. Justice Liacos 
also cited Lindsay v. Massias, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 381, 360 N.E.2d 631, which 
abolished the common law rule regarding the standard of care owed by a landlord 
to his tenants' visitors injured in common passageways. 
36 Trombetta's Case, 1 Mass. App. 102, 294 N.E.2d 484 (1973 ). See Locke, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, 1973 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw § 5.1 at 133-35. 
37 LocKE, supra note 4 at § 176; Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1968 
ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW § 16.5 at 413-14. 
38 Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 ( 1940) (emphasis 
added). 
30 In Fitzgibbon's Case, the Court speaks, mistakenly as I believe, of "a stress 
greater than the ordinary stresses of everyday work." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 682, 
373 N.E.2d at 1177 (emphasis added). This harks back to the archaic "condition 
peculiar to the employment" doctrine. A back injury resulting from repeated 
bending and twisting, which is the ordinary stress of everyday work, was held 
compensable in Trombetta's Case, note 36 supra. No higher standard should be 
involved in a mental disability case. 
8
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of the case, will probably exclude that course. In most cases which will 
arise specific facts and circumstances can be adduced hich indicate an 
aggravation of chronic stress in the period immediat ly preceding the 
mental or physical breakdown. A showing of this spe ific and localized 
stress should then take the matter out of the wear an tear problem. It 
is more likely that future cases will see the Court furt er confine Begin's 
Case 40 or by-pass it entirely, as the Court did with orsun's Case 41 in 
the Fitzgibbons' decision. 
None of this means that the Pandora's Box has b en opened. The 
burden of proof and the burden of persuasion still re ains on the claim-
ant to show that the claimed mental or emotional dis bility was indeed 
the result of either a sudden traumatic event at work r such work stress 
over a limited period of time as to overcome the clai ant's normal ad-
justment processes. The comment of the Court in B zozowski's Case 4!! 
is apropos: 
The occupational strain which gives rise to injury eed not be an 
unusual one or the result of heavy work. Doubtless where it occurs 
in cases of unusual exertion it is easier to. find tha the employee's 
condition was attributable to his work, but strain resulting from 
work that is neither heavy nor unusual may also for the basis of a 
finding that the employee has sustained a personal i jury.43 
A similar difficulty will confront the claimant in a p ychological injury 
case. 
§4.3. Third Party Actions: Liability of Employer f r Contribution or 
Indemnification. For the second time in this Survey year the Supreme 
Judicial Court has ruled on a previously unsettled orkmen's compen-
sation issue. Aligning Massachusetts with the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions, the Court in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Weste lind 1 held that a 
third party tort-feasor has no right to receive contrib tion from a cov-
ered employer 2 whose negligence contributed to the mployee's injury.3 
The Court also refused to permit the third party to implead the em-
ployer on an indemnity count, on the factual ground that there was no 
contractual basis, either express or implied, on w ich the employer 
40 See text at notes 15-19 supra. 
41 See text at notes 20-21 .sUpra. 
42 328 Mass. 113, 102 N.E.2d 399 (1951). 
43 Id. at 115, 102 N.E.2d at 400. 
§4.3. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 526, 373 N.E.2d 957 (per Atams, J. ). 
2 An employer becomes "covered" under the Workmen' Compem;ation Act 
becoming an insured or self-insurer. See G.L. c. 152, § 1 ( ) . 
3 This issue has been described by the present author as "open in Massa-
chusetts." See L. LocKE, WoRKI\IEN's CoMPEKSATION, 29 Masr. Prac. § 651 at 120 
( 1977 Supp.) ( hereintfter cited as LocKE). I 
9
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could be held liable to indemnify the defendant.4 The issue of whether, 
in a proper case, an employer could be held liable to a third party de-
fendant for indemnification still remains open.5 In both instances, the 
issue posed was whether the immunity granted to the employer ~nder 
sections 23 and 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 6 operates to 
insulate the employer from what would be, absent the Act, a liability 
for contribution or indemnification. But the Court decided the case 
on the state of current Massachusetts law on liability of a joint tort-
feasor for contribution and indemnity. 
The facts in W esterlind are particularly interesting in the analysis of 
this problem. Samuel DeFinnis was an employee of Brisk Waterproof-
ing Co., Inc. which had a contract with State Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. to waterproof its building in vVorcester. Westerlind was a visitor 
at the State Mutual building. DeFinnis was working without a safety 
belt on a scaffold. As Westerlind drove his car out of the building's 
garage, the car hooked onto a rope dangling from the scaffolding and 
DeFinnis fell to the ground, receiving fatal lllJUnes. Liberty Mutual 
paid workmen's compensation benefits and then, under chapter 152 
section 15, commenced this action against Westerlind, alleging that 
Westerlind's negligence caused the death and conscious suffering of 
DeFinnis. Westerlind filed a motion to implead Brisk, as a third party 
defendant, for both contribution and indemnification, on the ground 
that Brisk allowed the rope to dangle from the scaffolding, failed to 
require DeFinnis to wear a safety belt, did not properly hook the scaf-
folding to the wall of the building, and in various other ways failed 
to follow safety requirements, thereby contributing to the cause of the 
accident.7 
The superior court judge ruled that Westerlind could not press his 
claim for either contribution or indemnification since the proposed third 
party defendant was an employer who had paid workmen's compen-
sation benefits to an employee. He filed a comprehensive memorandum 
of decision detailing the reasons for his ruling and reserved and re-
ported the question of the correctness of his ruling. 8 The Supreme 
Judicial Court allowed direct appellate review on its own motion and 
affirmed the ruling below. 
57. 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 529, 373 N.E.2d at 959. 
5 Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1971 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw, § 4.2 at 
6 G.L. c. 152. 
7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 527, 373 N.E.2d at 958. 
8 Mass. R. Civ. P. 64; G.L. c. 231, § 111. 
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The decision is remarkably clear and brief. Althof.gh it is apparent 
from its references to Larson's treatise 9 that the Co rt was aware of 
the policy considerations and the development of t e law elsewhere, 
the Court decided the case in the light of Massachusetts law. It gave 
a literal reading to the language of the joint tort-feasor statute, which 
states: "Where two or more persons become jointly liable in tort for 
the same injury to person or property, there shall ~e a right of con-
tribution among them." 10 In a motor vehicle tort c~se, the Court had 
previously barred contribution unless the potential contributor was di-
rectly liable to the plaintiff.11 The Court followed the same reasoning 
in Westerlind. The exclusive remedy provisions of the Massachusetts 
Workmen's Compensation Act 12 gave Brisk a release from all tort claims 
which DeFinnis might have as a result of this acci~ent. Since Brisk 
could not be directly liable to DeFinnis, it was heHl that Wester lind 
enjoyed no right of contribution against Brisk.13 
The Court then dealt with the question of indemrity. On this, no 
statute covering indemnification barred the action, ut Massachusetts 
case law at most has "assumed" indemnity will be allowed in cases 
of express or implied contract or vicarious liability.14 The Court alluded 
to the problem of the employer's exclusive liability in compensation. 
It recognized that the majority position nationwide i~that a third party 
tort-feasor may recover indemnity from an employer here the employer 
had expressly or impliedly contracted to indemnify t e third party "or 
if the employer and third party stand in a relationship which carries 
9 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 528, 373 N.E.2d at 958-59, I'ting 2A A. LARSON, 
WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION LAw § 76.21 (1976) (hereinaft r cited as LARSON). 
Larson devotes 155 pages of his treatise, plus supplement, t a discussion of this 
problem which he entitles "Third Parties Action Over Ag inst Negligent Em-
ployer." He characterizes this as "perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy 
in all of compensation law .... " LARSON, at 14-287 n.62. 
10 G.L. c. 231B, § 1(a). 
11 O'Mara v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 359 Mass. 235, 23~-38, 268 N.E.2d 685, 
687 ( 1971 ), cited in this connection at LocKE, supra note 3. The present author 
had predicted, "If a third party against whom a tort suit h been brought under 
section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act were to seek contribution from the 
employer as a joint tort-feasor under the contribution statute, the O'Mara case 
suggests that recovery would be denied on the ground that the employer was not 
directly liable to the plaintiff-employee by virtue of sections 23 & 24 of the Act." 
Locke, Workmen's Compensation Late, 1971 ANx. Smw. MAss. ~Aw § 4.2 at 57. But 
see Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1888, 
378 N.E.2d 442, where the Court, in an opinion written by J stice Liacos, allowed 
interpleader of husband as driver of wife's vehicle, for co tribution as a joint 
tort-feasor. 
12 G.L. c. 152, §§ 23 & 24. 
14 See Stewart v. Roy Bros., 358 Mass. 446, 458, 265 N.E.2d 357, 365 (1970). 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 528-29, 373 N.E.2d at 959. ~ 
Stewart is discussed in Locke, Workmen's Compensation L w, 1971 ANN. SuRv. 
MAss. LAw § 4.2 at 52-57. 1 
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with it the obligation to indemnify the third party." 15 While the Court 
assumed that Massachusetts permits a third party to recover indemnifica-
tion from an insured employer if the latter has expressly or impliedly 
contracted to do so, it was unable to find that Brisk was under such a 
contractual obligation toward Westerlind. The Court noted that Wester-
lind was a complete stranger to Brisk, and therefore held that Wester-
lind had no right of indemnification from the insured employer, Brisk.16 
The next paragraph of the Court's decision deserves quotation in full. 
It explains why the decision is so brief and to the point; why it does 
not attempt to deal with the conflicting equities of the other parties or 
the schemes developed in other jurisdictions to deal with such conflict-
ing equities. The Court stated: 
Our decision denying Wester lind a right of contribution or indem-
nity is based on the present statutory schemes governing workmen's 
compensation and contribution. We are aware of the strong criti-
cism of the rules that a third party may not recover contribution 
from an insured employer and that only in limited circumstances 
may a third party recover indemnification from an insured employer. 
See 2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation§ 76.52 (1976); Locke, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, 1971, Ann. Survey Mass. Law 50, 
52-57. We also note that strong policy arguments exist on both 
sides of the issue whether a third party should have a right of 
recovery on the basis of contribution or indemnification. See 2A 
A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 76.51 (1976). Such con-
flicting policy considerations are best resolved in the Legislature 
where the resolution can be based on full consideration of the com-
peting interests and the ramifications involved with any change of 
the legislative scheme of G.L. c. 152. See 2A A. Larson, Work-
men's Compensation § 76.53 ( 1976) .17 
The decision has the virtue of definiteness and clarity. It upsets none 
of the assumptions on which the parties to the compensation system 
have operated over the years. It ventures on no new ground and im-
poses no burden on litigants and courts to work out a complex balance 
of interrelations between plaintiffs, compensation insurers, third party 
defendants, and employers, on a case by case basis. The Court leaves 
this task to the legislature. 
The issue of the third party wrongdoer's right to contribution or 
indemnification from the employer is beset with much unnecessary con-
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 529, 373 N.E.2d at 959. See LARSON, supra note 9, 
at §§ 76.40- 76.43. 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 529, 373 N.E.2d at 959. 
17 Id. 
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fusion and complexity in the case law developed in o her jurisdictions 
and discussed by textwriters. Resort to basic prin iples should be 
helpful. Let us visualize a triangle with three sets of relationships: 
Side 1. The right of the employee to compensation, a d the immunity 
of the employer from common law liability to the em loyee, based on 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, Side 2. The em loyee's common 
law right for redress of injury caused by a third par y, in a personal 
injury action at law against the wrongdoer, Side 3. T e right ·of action 
over by the third party tort-feasor against another fo contribution or 
for indemnification. 
Two sources of uncertainty can be seen at the outs t. The ~rst is a 
"semantic" problem which has been pointed out by Greaney.18 The 
employee's action against the tort-feasor is called, ·n compensation 
parlance, a "third party action," while that tort-feaso 's action to im-
plead the defendant under Mass. R. Civ. P. 14 is, in pro edural parlance, 
also called a third party action. This tends to confus ultimate rights 
and duties through an idle repetition of the word " mployer," when 
speaking of this party in its relationship to the third party defendant, 
on the third side of the triangle. We will refer to it t ere as the inter-
pleader defendant. 
A second source of uncertainty arises from the prese ce of insurance. 
In order to be covered under workmen's compensati n, an employer 
must become an insured person under the Act or ualify as a self-
insurerY' Similarly, it will often be the case that the t ird party wrong-
doer will be insured for general liability, and the em Ioyer itself may 
have a general liability carrier (frequently the same in urance company 
as writing workmen's compensation) to spread its lo s. Reference to 
these loss spreading mechanisms blurs the significan e of the result 
reached, whether contribution and/ or indemnification is permitted or 
barred. It is more revealing to disregard the fact th t the employer, 
third party defendant, and interpleader defendant, rna be insured. 
To resume our analysis: We start with the relatio ship of the em-
ployee and the employer under the Workmen's Comp nsation Act. It 
is commonly said, "Where it applies, the Workmen's ompensation Act 
is the exclusive remedy available to an employee to ecure reparation 
from his employer for an injury arising out of and n the course of 
employment. In return for providing compensation o his employees 
regardless of fault, an employer who becomes an insu ed person under 
the Act obtains immunity from actions at law by is employees." 2o 
l8 Greaney, Workmen's Compensation-Third Party Action Liability of Negli-
gent Employer for Contribution or Indemnification, 63 MAss. L. REv. 181, 182 n.l. 
19 See note 1 supra. 
20 LocKE, supra note 3, § 651 at 762 n.l. 
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However, the Massachusetts compensation act contains no specific state-
ment to this effect. The exclusiveness concept must be extrapolated 
from several sections of the Act. An employer becomes an insured 
person by providing for the payment to his employees by an insurer 
of the compensation provided for, or becomes a self-insurer under sub-
sections 2 (a) or 2 (b) of section 25A. 21 By so doing, he obtains an 
immunity from actions at law under section 66,22 by the terms of sec-
tion 67.23 By section 24 an employee is held to have waived his right 
of action at common law to recover damages for personal injury if he 
shall not have given his employer at the time of the contract of hire 
written notice that he claimed such right.24 Therefore, even if an 
employee does not claim compensation for an injury, he has no right to 
sue his employer for such injury. By section 23, in addition, if an 
employee files any claim for, or accepts payment of, compensation on 
account of personal injury under the Act, or makes any agreement or 
submits to a hearing before a member of the Industrial Accident Board, 
that action is held to "constitute a release to the insurer or self-insurer 
of all claims or demands at law, if any, arising from the injury."25 In 
other words, chapter 152 speaks only to the immunity of the employer 
from actions at law by the employee and only to the release or waiver by 
the employee of actions at law against the employer and gives no broad 
grant of immunity to the employer against persons other than the 
employee or those standing in his shoes. In this respect the exclusiveness 
language of the Massachusetts act is more limited than that of other 
states. The typical wording provides that the liability of an employer 
shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever to such 
employee, his personal representatives, spouse, parents, dependants or 
next of kin, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages at common 
law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.20 We will return 
later to the effect that should be given to the narrower scope of the ex-
clusive remedy provision of the Massachusetts act. 
We next tum to the employee-third party tort-feasor side of the tri-
angle. The employee's right of action against the third party tort-feasor 
is not defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the grounds 
of liability rest upon common law or statute.:n Section 15 of chapter 
21 G.L. c. 152, § 25A. 
22 Id. § 66. 
23 Id. § 67. 
24 Id. § 24. 
25 Id. § 23. 
26 LARSON, supra note 9, at § 76.30. 
27 See Becker v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co., 279 Mass. 435, 441-42, 181 N.E. 757, 
759 ( 1932 ), cited for this point by Babitsky, Third Party Actions Under the Massa-
chusetts Workers' Compensation Act, BosTON BAR J. (Dec. 1978) 16 at 17 (here-
inafter cited as Babitsky). 
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152 governs only the relation between the employee and the employer 
in such action.28 The concept underlying the third party provisions of 
the Act is to insure, first, that the loss caused by thf wrongdoing ulti-
mately falls on the wrongdoer, while preserving the employee's right 
to compensation, and, second, that the employee should not at the same 
time have double recovery for the injury, once by w~y of compensation 
and again by way of damages.29 1 
Third, we examine the relationship between the th~rd party defendant 
and the employer in his capacity as an int.erpleader defendant for con-
tribution or indemnity. Putting to one side for the moment the effect 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act on these rel~tions, we can im-
mediately see that there can be several different ituations. At one 
extreme, there may have been no prior relationship between the third 
party defendant and the interpleader defendant, as where a truck driver 
is involved in a collision with a third party vehicle, and the third party 
defendant seeks to implead the truck driver's employrr as a contribution 
defendant because of his negligence in maintaining he vehicle. There 
it is the collision that creates whatever relationship will then exist be-
tween parties who previously had none at all. This seems to be the 
situation present in W esterlind. At the opposite extreme, there may 
have been a close contractual relation, as where an I employer has con-
tracted with the third party defendant to provide a service which will 
be performed on the employer's premises, or, in the reverse, where the 
third party defendant has contracted with the employer to provide a 
service to be performed on the third party's premises.30 Between 
these. extremes any number of intermediate situations~can be postulated. 
The relationship between the parties may also be analyzed in terms 
of whether the third party defendant and the emplo er had anticipated 
the possibility of an injury and had made prior arrangements to share 
the burden. At one extreme, we have again the situation of the acci-
dental injury between strangers, who had no opporyity to make prior 
arrangements and are therefore left to the tender ercies of the law 
to adjust their rights and responsibilities. At the opposite extreme, 
28 Section 15 was radically amended by Acts of 1971, c. 888, which became 
effective on January 12, 1972. Third party suits and statutiry subrogation is dis-
cussed generally in chapter 33 of LocKE, supra note 3. The 1971 revision of § 15 
is specifically described at id., § 661 at 123 (1977 Supp. ). 
29 Richard v. Arsenault, 349 Mass. 521, 524, 209 N .E. d 334, 336 ( 1965); 
Furlong v. Cronan, 305 Mass. 464, 467, 266 N.E.2d 382, 385 ( 1940); McDonald 
v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 288 Mass. 170, 174, 192 N.E. 608, 609 (1934). 
30 In W esterlind, the plaintiff also brought a personal injury action against State 
Mutual, which had contracted Brisk to provide waterproorng services to State 
Mutual's building. State Mutual was not involved in the interpleader of Brisk, 
and played no part in the present case. 
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the employer and the third party may have had extensive business re-
lationships and have made detailed provisions in the form of indemni-
fication contracts or save-harmless clauses to regulate the loss sharing. 
Closer to this latter end of the scale would be an implied contract of 
indemnification, based on the facts as they appear to the court. But 
the large middle ground between these extremes is at present untouched. 
This is the area in which the courts are asked to fill in what the parties 
themselves had failed to arrange. It is in this area, it is submitted, 
that the courts have gone astray, confusing the relationship that the 
interpleader defendant has with his employee and the obligations that 
the law would otherwise impose on this wrongdoer for his share in the 
harm done to the plaintiff and, indirectly by his wrongful act, on the 
joint tort-feasor. 
By making a distinction between contribution and indemnification, 
the courts give substance to the loss sharing mechanisms arranged by 
parties in close business relationships. It is generally held that the 
exclusive remedy provision of a compensation act does not prevent an 
action for indemnification based upon express contract in which the 
employer agrees to indemnify the third party for the type of damages 
the third party has been required to pay the employee.31 
The rationale in states having the usual exclusive remedy clause is 
that the recovery is not "on account of" the injury, but rather "on 
account of" the contract of indemnity itself. One advantage of the 
narrower exclusive remedy language of the Massachusetts compensation 
act is that the issue as to whether the recovery is on account of the 
injury or on account of the contract does not even arise, since the phrase 
being distinguished does not appear in the Massachusetts act. The 
case law on the employer's obligation to indemnity under an express 
contract derives from the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.32 Although 
that decision arose under admiralty law, and carries many of its hall-
marks, its influence extends into state decisions. 
State courts differ, however, when the relationship between the parties 
is based on contract and the third party seeks to read in an obligation 
of care with an accompanying implied obligation of indemnification, 
which may survive the exclusiveness defense.33 Again, the cases seem 
31 See LARSON, supra note 9, § 76.41 at 14-324 n.37. Larson characterizes this 
as "the clearest exception to the exclusive liability clause." Id. 
32 350 u.s. 124 (1956). 
33 See LARSON, supra note 9, at § 76.43 (d). Larson lists the following decisions 
as permitting such implied indemnification to overcome the exclusiveness doctrine: 
American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); Burris v. 
American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 ( 2d Cir. 1941 )(applying New York law); 
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to stress the difficulty in overcoming the exclusive re edy provisions of 
the respective state laws. Such difficulty would no present itself in 
Massachusetts, which contains no such all-inclusive exclusive remedy 
clause. The problem in Massachusetts is the other ha of the equation, 
namely whether state law would imply an indemnity, in the absence of 
an express contract, in favor of the third party de endant. On this, 
W esterlind says merely, "Assuming that in Massachu etts a third party 
may recover indemnification from an insured employ r if the employer 
expressly or impliedly contracted to hold the third pa ty harmless .... " 34 
But an assumption in a decision is a far cry from a r le of law, and as 
yet no Massachusetts case has allowed an action for ndemnification on 
a contract expressed or implied, where the implead r was against an 
employer covered under the compensation act. 
The third situation, in which the third party defe dant seeks to en-
force a non-contractual right to indemnification agai st a covered em-
ployer, has found little support as yet in the decision .35 An action for 
non-contractual indemnity against the wrongdoing employer would 
probably not be frustrated in Massachusetts on the e elusiveness princi-
ple, the main basis on which such actions have fai ed in other juris-
dictions. an In these cases the courts never reach the r ghts of the parties 
for indemnification based upon relative degree of fau t, as in any event 
the case is barred by the exclusive-remedy provision. I Of more interest, 
therefore, in Massachusetts are the cases involving the minority rule. 
The leading case of Dole v. Dote Chemical Co.3 ; a ·ose in New York. 
An employee of Urban Milling Co. had died as a re ult of exposure to 
a poisonous fumigant manufactured by Dow. The idow of the em-
ployee sued Dow, charging failure to give sufficie t warning of the 
fumigant's danger to potential users. In turn, Dow ade a claim as a 
third party plaintiff against Urban, alleging negligen failure to follow 
precautions on the label and the accompanying lit rature, and other 
Ham v. Standard Eng'r Co., 416 F. Supp. 1168 (D. S. Dak. 976) (applying South 
Dakota law); Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 856, 118 
N.W.2d 559 ( 1962); McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman- anks-Walsh Painting 
Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959); Whittenberg Eng'r & C nstr. Co. v. Liberty 
Mutual Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. App. 1965); San Fra cisco Unified School 
Dist. v. Calif. Bldg. Maintenance, 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 3 8 P.2d 785 ( 1958). 
See also Saad v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 399 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Mich. 1975) 
(applying Michigan law). 
3-l 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 529, 373 N.E.2d at 959 (emph is added). 
35 LARSON, supra note 9, at § 76.44. 
36 See General Electric Co. v. Cuban American Nickel Co., 96 F.2d 89, 97 (5th 
Cir. 1968)(per Wisdom, J., applying Louisiana law); Slatter v. Marra Bros., 186 
F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951)(per L. Hand, J., applying N w Jersey law). See 
also LAHSON, supra note 9, § 76.44 at 14-394 to 14-395 n.8 . 
37 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1 72). 
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negligent acts in the use of the chemical.38 The prestigious New York 
Court of Appeals held that Dow's claim would lie and launched a new 
rule that the right to indemnity "should rest on relative responsibility 
and may be apportioned on the facts."39 While the Court's interpre-
tation of the relationship between the third party and the employer was 
couched in terms of the exclusiveness-provision of the New York statute, 
its general comment is apropos: "Plaintiff [Dow] asserts its own right 
of recovery for breach of alleged independent duty or obligation owed 
to it by the defendant." 40 The Dole case is clearly not yet authority 
in Massachusetts. 
Where does fairness lie, in this complex of relations? On the first 
side of the triangle, employee-employer in the compensation situation, 
there is no longer any unfairness, since the legislature has eliminated the 
requirement, previously insisted upon in section 15, that an employee 
elect between his right to compensation under chapter 152 and his 
pursuit of a personal injury action at law against the third party tort-
feasor.H There is, similarly, little unfairness on the second side of the 
triangle, the personal injury action at law against the third party tort-
feasor, subject to the procedural requirements of section 15, as amended. 
Whatever problems still exist in balancing the right of the employee 
himself to bring the third party action against the right of the insurance 
carrier, or in the role of the employee or insurer as the case may be 
when the other brings the action, such problems are beyond the scope 
of this article.42 
Unfortunately, the bulk of the unfairness attaches on the third side 
of the triangle, and there the unfairness largely burdens the third party 
defendant who has been effectively barred of his right of contribution 
and indemnification from the employer, with the sole possible ex-
ception of an express (or less likely, implied) contract of indemnifi-
cation. The happenstance that his victim was an employee of a wrong-
doer whose fault contributed to the accident serve to deprive him of 
contribution or indemnification. The defendant as a complete stranger 
to the compensation scheme could well feel that he is being unfairly 
asked to subsidize a compensation system from which he receives no 
as Id. at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385. 
39 Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 3.31 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92, quoted by LARSON, 
supra note 9, § 76.44 at 14-403 n.94.1. 
40 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390. 
41 See Acts of 1971, c. 888, amending G.L. c. 152, § 15, applying to causes of 
action arising on or after January 12, 1972. For a discussion of the problem of 
election of remedies, see LocKE, supra note 3, at § 668. 
42 Some problems still remain after the amendment of § 15 referred to in note 
41 supra. The subject is discussed at. length in LARSON, supra note 9, § 74 at 
14-180 to 14-256. See also Babitsky, supra note 27 at 16-21. 
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benefit. Not only is there unfairness in the third party defendant's loss 
of contribution, but there is a more serious unfairn~ss in the benefit 
additionally conferred on the employer: not only is he relieved of the 
obligation to contribute to the results of his wrongdoi~g, but he will be 
reimbursed in full for the compensation he has been required to pay. 
He comes out completely clean from a situation in '}vhich his wrong-
doing was a contributing part. 
This result conflicts with the public policy underlyiJg both the Work-
men's Compensation Act and the tort law of damages for injury. As a 
means of providing income support and medical card to the victim of 
industrial injury, the compensation scheme is justified as a loss-sharing 
mechanism and as an encouragement to industrial! safety.43 Reim-
bursement of the employer whose fault contributed to the injury upsets 
both the loss-sharing mechanism and the incentive td industrial safety. 
Depriving the third party tort-feasor of his contribution or indemnity, 
on the other hand, distorts the loss-sharing mechanistn of the tort law 
of damages by placing the whole cost on that defendant. In those 
cases where his liability is vicarious, or where the employer created the 
dangerous situation which the third party defendant merely has failed 
to detect, it removes the incentive for safety by m~king lack of care 
irrelevant to the distribution of loss. 
As it now stands, the law is anomalous in its resulL the third party 
defendant least able to anticipate the accident and lefist able to protect 
himself from its consequences is deprived of his right of contribution 
or indemnification, while the defendant who anticipates the possible 
consequences of his negligence is able to guarantee that a share of the 
resulting loss will be borne by the employer, by exa9ting a contract of 
indemnification. The further removed from the compensation scheme 
the third party defendant is, the more clearly is he prevented from 
obtaining a share of his loss from the employer. I 
If we now return to W esterlind, we can be perlf.itted some disap-
pointment that the Court did not undertake an analysis of the issue, 
especially as it applies to contribution. The Court ~egards its holding 
as an inevitable consequence of the language of chapter 231B, section 
43 See generally REPORT OF THE C'OMI\USSION ON COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL 
AcciDENTS ( 1912) for a history of the movement for a compehsation law in Massa-
chusetts, the text of the original 1911 Massachusetts Competl.sation Act, commen-
tary on the Act, and other supplementary material. See also LocKE, supra note 3 
at chapter 2 (entitled "History and Development"); SoME¥ & SoMERS, WoRK-
MEN's CoMPENSATION (1954). Apart from the obligation to provide for insurance 
coverage, the employer's only direct financial obligation based 
1 
on fault occurs when 
the injury is the result of his serious and willful miscondudt, in which case the 
amounts of compensation payable are doubled under G.L. c. 152, § 28. 
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1 (a). That statute was designed to overcome the common law rule 
barring contribution among tort-feasors.44 It is written in terms of the 
liability of each defendant to the plaintiff, but in essence it seeks to 
define the relations between the two wrongdoers themselves. It does 
not seem inevitable to believe that the legislature when it gave a right 
of contribution among "two or more persons [who had] become jointly 
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property,"45 intended to 
provide an immunity to an employer because of its workmen's compen-
sation coverage. Could not it reasonably be held that by the phrase 
"jointly liable in tort for the same injury," the legislature was attempting 
to define the grounds of a contributor's fault on which the right of 
contribution should be based?46 Thus, in O'Mara,47 the operator of 
the car in which the plaintiff had been a passenger would· not have 
been liable to the plaintiff in the absence of gross negligence. The 
requisite degree of fault was not present on which a right of contribution 
could be based. But in W esterlind, apart from the provisions of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act granting an immunity to the employer 
from suits by his employee, the third party complaint for contribution 
alleged a sufficient degree of wrongdoing to have made the contributor 
liable for personal injuries to the plaintiff. 
Pennsylvania has followed this line of reasoning in allowing a third 
party action over against the employer in contribution, using the rationale 
that the definition of tort-feasor does not require that they have a 
common liability toward the injured party, but only that their combined 
44 W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF ToRTS, § 47 at 274 (3d ed. 1964) states, "The 
great majority of our courts . . . refused to permit contribution even where in-
dependent, although concurrent, negligence had contributed to a single result." 
Prosser relates that the obvious lack of sense and justice in this rule resulted in 
unanimous criticism and led to the passage of statutes which, to a greater or 
lesser extent, permitted contribution among tort-feasors. 
45 See G.L. c. 231B, § 1(a). 
46 In Hayon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1888, 1893-94, 378 N.E.2d 442, 445, Justice Liacos, writing for the· Court, stated 
in reference to the joint tort-feasors statute: 
It is plain that the evil to be remedied was the ·unfairness of allowing a 
disproportionate share of the plaintiff's recovery to be borne by one of several 
joint tortfeasors, and the object to be accomplished was a more equitable 
distribution of that burden among those liable in tort for the same injury .... 
The term "liable in tort" . . . is broad in scope and not suitable language 
for implying a narrow or restricted range of application within the framework 
of potential tort defendants. 
In Rayon the Court held that the subsequent abrogation of the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity should be applied in construing the 1963 joint tort-feasors 
statute, and permitted interpleader of the host husband. That was as far as the 
Court had to go to allow the interpleader, but the cited language would support 
broader applications. 
47 O'Mara v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 359 Mass. 235, 268 N.E.2d 685 ( 1971). 
See note 11 supra. 
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conduct be the cause of the injury.48 We have ecently seen that 
statutes of major import can be considered as es ablishing a policy 
carrying "significance beyond the particular scope" of the statute in-
volved.40 Once the concept of contribution amon joint tort-feasors 
has been enacted as public policy,50 it is submitt d that courts can 
develop their own doctrine of a "common law" ontribution among 
joint tort-feasors, not strictly limited by the terms of the statute.111 
In other contexts employers are not immune to s it by parties who 
do not stand in the employee's shoes. Thus, parent of a minor child 
retain their common law right of action for medical expens_es arid loss 
of services resulting from a compensable injury.5 The employee's 
waiver of common law rights has been held not to ap ly to other persons 
who have independent rights against the employer.5 Similarly, where 
two older children of a deceased employee were sta utory beneficiaries 
under chapter 229, section 5, but were not entitl d to dependency 
benefits under the compensation act, the administr tor of the estate 
of a deceased employee was held entitled to bring action against the 
negligent third party under the death act on behal of a widow and 
all six children, despite the fact that the widow and our youngest were 
receiving dependency benefits under the compensatio act.54 The Reidy 
case points in the direction of allowing an independ nt right of action 
against the employer where the persons on whose behalf the action is 
brought have no rights as dependents under the compensation act. 
The reasoning in both Reidy and King is similar. S nee the parents of 
the minor child and the non-dependent next of k" waive no rights 
under section 23 of chapter 152 by claiming or accep ing benefits under 
the Act, they are not within the ambit of the emplo ee's waiver under 
section 24; their separate and independent rights are not subject to the 
Act and should not be affected by its provisions. As King emphasized, 
" ... another rule of statutory construction is that a , existing common 
law remedy is not to be taken away by statute u ess by direct en-
actment or necessary implication." 55 In the Wester ind situation, it is 
48 See Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 216 A.2d 3 8, 320 ( Pa. 1966); 
LARSON, supra note 9, § 76.22 at 14-307, 14-308. 
411 See Moragne v. State's Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 37 , 390 (1970). 
50 See G.L. c. 231B, § 1(a). 
51 See Gaudet v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 71, 284 N.E.2d 22 , 229 (1972). The 
Court, per Justice Quirico, discussed the wrongful death ac , G.L. c. 229, § 2, 
stating, "Consequently, our wrongful death statutes will no l nger be regarded as 
'creating the right' to recovery for wrongful death." 
52 King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 422, 106 N.E. 988~ 988 ( 1918). 
53 Id. 
54 Reidy v. Old Colony Gas Co., 315 Mass. 631, 634, 53 N.E.2d 707, 709-10 
(1944). See LocKE, supra note 3, § 653 at 767-68 n.20. 
55 219 Mass. at 425, 106 N.E. at 989. 
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the insurer who is in the employee's shoes, not the third party de-
fendant. An interpretation of the joint tort-feasor statute allowing 
interpleader of the employer to enforce the third party's claim for a 
share of damages for the employer's wrongdoing would thus not violate 
any immutable principle of Massachusetts compensation theory. 
After W esterlind, it is apparent that the only route available for the 
third party defendant to secure a share of his loss lies in development 
of the law of indemnity. At present, we "assume" that an employer 
could be impleaded on an express contract-or perhaps even an implied 
contract-of indemnity.uo The more elaborate concepts of indemnity 
being developed elsewhere are still to be developed in this common-
wealth. But unless the legislature sees fit to set up a "Blue Ribbon 
Committee" to review this entire subject and come up with a balanced 
statute, it is likely that pressure will be brought through the courts for 
loss-sharing along the lines of implied contracts of indemnification, in-
demnification based upon degrees of fault, of active and passive negli-
gence, of primary and secondary wrongdoing, and similar theories now 
being developed elsewhere.57 Third party defendants will not sit by 
idly and accept peaceably a situation in which they are deprived of 
a share of reimbursement for injuries which may be partly the result of 
the employer's negligence or indeed of his primary wrongdoing. 
It is unlikely that the New York rule enunciated in Dole 58 will find 
immediate support in Massachusetts, which has not yet adopted doctrines 
of active and passive negligence or degrees of wrongdoing as a basis 
for indemnification between wrongdoers. But if there is to be judicial 
development of the doctrine of indemnification as a solution to the 
problem of loss-sharing by the employer or other primary wrongdoer, 
the Dole case seems to point in the right direction. As Larson said, 
"It may well be the fairest compromise yet achieved in the tangled 
skein of conflicting equities and policies."50 
It would be best if the legislature were to confront squarely the issue 
of the relative rights and responsibilities of the employee, employer, 
and third party defendant in this situation, and not leave it to judicial 
development. Having said that, it must be recognized that it is un-
likely the matter will be given serious legislative attention at a time 
when other issues are more pressing and seem more deserving of 
legislative concern. It must also be recognized that when attention is 
56 See text at note 34 supra. 
57 See LARSON, supra note 9, at § 76.43 (d) (actions under state law to enforce 
employer's contractual right to indemnity); § 76.44 (actions based on non-con-
tractual indemnity). 
58 See text at notes 37-40 supra. 
50 LARSoN, supra note 9, § 76.44 at 14-405 n.94.6. 
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I 
given, considerations other than those of policy and equity may well 
prevail. Therefore, it is probably inevitable that thr matter will again 
and again be presented to our courts. The policy ~ssues will not just 
go away and must eventually be confronted and resolved in the painful 
course of judicial construction. · 
§4.4. Personal Injury: Aggravation of Sensitive Rbspiratory Tract by 
Exposure to Anti-Freeze Fumes While Operating Company Vehicle. In 
an interesting rescript opinion, Casey's Case,! the Appeals Court re-
instated an award of compensation for periods of totfl incapacity which 
resulted from the plaintiff-employee's inhalation of ethelyne glycol 
fumes. The employee's injury was caused by vaporization of anti-freeze 
fumes released through a crack in the engine block oB a company vehicle 
that he had been operating. The single member oE the Industrial Ac-
cident Board found that the fumes resulted in "aggravating [the em-
ployee's] sensitive underlying respiratory condition 4ausing sore throat, 
runny nose, nausea, coughing spells, and colds."2 the Board affirmed 
this award, but was reversed by the superior court. In reversing the 
superior court and reinstating the award, the Appeals Court found 
ample basis for the Board's decision in the testinlwny of a medical 
expert.3 
The case is interesting in that the exposure ~d resulting injury 
occurred between September, 1962 and April, 1963,1 but disability first 
began in June of 1963. The disability resulted in loss of occasional 
days, with a single continuous period of disability of sixteen days from 
November 2 to November 17, 1963. The emplovee's testimony ap-
parently had been "rather vague" as to exposure ~nd periods of dis-
ability, and the court held that it was therefore "not irrational" for the 
single member to look to the company records an~ attribute to toxic 
exposure those absences which the records indica~ed were generally 
due to symptoms connected with the injury.4 
It is s. ettled law that "[ w ]here personal injury resu~ts from the gra.dual 
impairment of the body because of the absorption <f fumes, gases, dirt 
or other harmful foreign matter, the date of injury is the day of the 
last exposure bearing a causal relation to the incapacity or death."5 
Usually this is the last day of employment prior to lthe commencement 
of disability. But this is not necessarily so. In niany cases, there is 
a period of '1atency" following the last date of exposure, with the actual 
§4.4. 1 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 287, 374 N.E.2d 32. 
2 Id. at 287, 374 N.E.2d at 333. . 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 L. LocKE, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION, 29 Mass. Prac.l§ 177, at 209 ( 1968). 
See id. at n.70 for extended list of such cases. 
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disability occurring only months or years later. Prominent examples 
are disabilities caused by asbestosis,6 berylliosis/ and a host of diseases 
caused by chemical insult which only now are beginning to be identified. 
In Casey's Case the period of exposure was between September, 1962 
and April, 1963, and apparently three months elapsed before the first 
disability attributable to this exposure. The case is thus controlled by 
Steuterman's Case,8 which was cited by the court. In Steuterman's Case 
the Court upheld a decree which was based on findings that the :per-
sonal injury to the employee from exposure to fumes was complete in 
the early part of 1944 although it only resulted in disability starting 
January 4, 1946, about two years later.9 The Appeals Court also cited 
Trombetta's Case,10 a case involving aggravation of a back injury from 
the ordinary physical activities of a laborer's job. The analogy between 
injury resulting from exposure to a toxic substance and a back injury 
resulting from repeated manipulations of the back in the course of 
ordinary work is highly suggestive. 
§4.5. Non-Insured Employer: Personal Injury Action Allowed, Though 
Employer Insured in New Hampshire and Compensation Paid Under New 
Hampshire Law: Chapter 152, Sections 66 and 67. To obtain coverage 
under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act and thereby 
obtain immunity from a common law action for personal injuries based 
on its negligence, an employer must become an insured person under 
the Massachusetts Act or qualify as a self-insurer.1 If the employer fails 
to obtain insurance under the Act, it is liable in a personal injury action 
at law by its employee, who need only show that the injury arose out 
of and in the course of employment, and would otherwise be payable 
under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act.2 The employer 
loses his possible defenses that the employee was contributorily negli-
gent, that he had assumed the risk of injury, or that the injury was 
the result of a fellow employee's neglect. Moreover, the employee need 
not even prove that the employer was negligent. It is sufficient if he 
establishes that the employer had an obligation to insure under the Act, 
that he failed to do so, and that the injury would otherwise have been 
compensable. 3 
6 Brek's Case, 335 Mass. 144, 138 N.E.2d 748 (1956). 
7 Beausoleil's Case, 321 Mass. 344, 73 N.E.2d 461 (1947). 
s 323 Mass. 454, 82 N.E.2d 601 (1948). 
9 Id. at 457, 82 N.E.2d at 602. 
1o 1 Mass. App. 102, 105, 294 N.E.2d 484, 485 ( 1973). 
§4.5. 1 G.L. c. 152, §§ 1(b), 25A-25D. 
2 Id. §§ 66, 67. 
3 Tracy v. Cambridge Junior College, 364 Mass. 367, 304 N.E.2d 921 (1973); 
Zarba v. Lane, 322 Mass. 132, 76 N.E.2d 318 (1947). 
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It is the Massachusetts law with which we are concerned. The ob-
ligation to become an insured person under the ~bss1c~usetts Act arises 
as soon as an employee engages in employment in fMassachusetts that 
would be covered under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation 
Act were he to be injured. At that point the employer is burdened 
with the obligation to provide Massachusetts comHensation coverage. 
That he may have coverage under the law of anoth~r state, where the 
employee normally conducts his business, is of np significance and 
provides him with no defense. This is so, even if compensation was 
offered and accepted under the law of this other state. Such is the 
holding of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Barrett v. 
Transformer Service, Inc.4 The insurer's "backfield lrunning'' in an at-
tempt to evade a personal injury action was clearly +oted by the Court 
and held to be of no avail. · 
Barrett was employed by Transformer Service, Inc., a New Hamp-
shire corporation. Transformer Service re-circulated~and re-conditioned 
oil in transformers while the transformers were rece' ing electrical cur-
rent and remaining in operation. It performed this n site work under 
contract for various companies in Massachusetts as well as in New 
Hampshire. A superior directed Barrett to carry out an assignment at 
the plant of Foster Grant Co., Inc., in Leomin~er, Massachusetts. 
While working at the Foster Grant plant, Barrett nwittingly touched 
a bare wire leading to the transformer and suffered extreme shock and 
burns which resulted in the amputation of his right forearm.5 Trans-
former Service filed the usual accident report with the New Hampshire 
Workmen's Compensation Authority. It was liable under the New 
Hampshire compensation statute, and it took out l policy with Em-
ployers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin to 9over this liability.G 
Toward the end of February, 1968, Barrett's attorney called the New 
England office of Employers Mutual and inquired whether they would 
pay Massachusetts rather than New Hampshire com*ensation rates and 
benefits, the Massachusetts rates being more favora le. Compensation 
was paid at New Hampshire rates. Barrett then fil d a claim with the 
Massachusetts Division of Industrial Accidents, to ·which the insurer 
replied that the policyholder had no Massachusetts coverage and that 
the case came under the New Hampshire law. Only after Barrett 
commenced a personal injury action in superior co~rt on December 4, 
l96R did the insurer concede that it had Massachus1tts coverage. Bar-
rett's counsel replied that he could not accept this concession in view 
of the insurer's often reiterated position that it had no coverage in 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 773, 374 N.E.2d 1325 (per Kapl~n, J.). 
5 Id. at 774, 374 N.E.2d at 1326. I 
G Id. at 775, 374 N.E.2d at 1326. 1 
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Massachusetts. He "suggested that the insurer had been trying to 
maneuver Barrett into the cheapest schedule of payments and that its 
present tactic was due to the filing of the tort action." 7 The opinion 
relates a series of internal actions between Transformer Service and 
Employers Mutual regarding various "riders'' in a belated attempt to 
provide valid coverage in Massachusetts.8 
The Court held, firstly, that the Massachusetts act gave protection for 
the accident on the work performed in Massachusetts, even though the 
employer was a New Hampshire company and the employee himself 
lived there. The Court cited Lavoie's Case 0 as dispositive of this issue. 
Since there was Massachusetts jurisdiction over the work, the em-
ployer was bound to take steps to become an insured under the Massa-
chusetts act or suffer exposure to a personal injury action under sections 
66 and 67.10 The Court reviewed the ex post facto efforts of the insurer 
to provide Massachusetts coverage, but concluded that it had not suc-
ceeded in doing so.U Nothing would be gained in reviewing this aspect 
of the decision, since it deals primarily with the intricacies of insurance 
law. Of more interest is the Court's comment that the superior court 
judge ... 
thought the insurer should be taken at its word in its repeated 
representations that there was no such coverage. He concluded 
that the insurer was estopped vis-a-vis Barrett. Barrett's reliance 
could be seen in his resort to the § 66 action. The judge, however, 
thought the insurer should not be considered to have been acting 
for Transformer Service ... when it made the representation.12 
The Court commented, however, that although the superior court judge 
had felt that the estoppel did not extend from the insurer to the em-
ployer, Transformer Service, the defendant in the section 66 action, a 
question might still be raised whether the estoppel should apply to 
Transformer Service to the extent of any duty the insurer might owe 
Transformer Service in the case of a judgment against it under section 
66, on a general liability policy. The Court intimated no opinion on 
that issue.13 
The Court in Barrett exhibited particular concern for the unfairness 
to injured employees that would result if insurers and employers were 
7 Id. at 777, 374 N.E.2d at 1327. 
s Id. at 777-78, 374 N.E.2d at 1327. 
9 334 Mass. 403, 135 N.E.2d 750 ( 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 927 (1956). 
On the basis of \[assachusetts jurisdiction, see L. LocKE, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSA-
TION, 29 Mass. Prac. §§ 41-47 ( 1968). 
10 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 778, 374 N.E.2d at 1328. 
n Id. at 779, 374 N.E.2d at 1328. 
12 Id. at 784, 374 N.E.2d at 1330. 
13 Id. at 783-84, 374 N.E.2d at 1330. 
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allowed to reverse their positions as to coverage after the occurrence 
of an accident. It appeared willing to entertain employee tort actions 
when employers have not timely complied with the compensation act. 
Thus the case highlights the more substantial damagls available to an 
injured employee in the personal injury tort action, a compared to the 
benefits of the compensation act. It should serve as n encouragement 
to counsel to investigate and analyze their cases car fully to bring to 
their clients the maximum monetary recovery. 
§4.6. Common Employment Defense Inapplicable Where Subcontrac-
tors' Work is ''Ancillary and Incidental": When Question of Fact or Matter 
of Law. The common employment defense to actions at law for personal 
injuries was abolished by legislative amendment in 1971.1 As was stated 
in these pages, "[s]ince injuries occurring before tha~ date are still af-
fected by the common employment doctrine, lawye! and courts will 
still be obliged to deal with its intricacies, and inju ed workmen and 
their dependents will still suffer from its inequitie for a few more 
years." 2 • 
In the Survey year, the common employment issue rose in two cases. 
In Bulpett v. Dodge Assoc., Inc.,3 the Appeals Court reversed a jury 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, reasoning in part, that the common 
employment defense barred his action as a matter of law. In Poirier v. 
Town of Plymouth,4 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the ruling of 
the trial judge that as a matter of law the common e ployment defense 
did not apply and refused to put the issue to the j ry. 
The doctrine of the common employment defense is based on sections 
15, 18, and 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. As was stated in 
Glark v. M.W. Leahy Co.:5 
These three sections in combination have resulted in the estab-
lishment of a rule, governing common law actions for personal in-
juries suffered by employees of the contractor and of subcontrac-
tors where the work is done under a general contractor who is an 
"insured person," that might not be apparent from a mere reading 
of the statute. The insurance of the general contra tor or "common 
employer" . . . throws its shadow over the whol work. In that 
§4.6. 1 G.L. c. 152, § 15, amended by Acts of 1971, c. 941 § 2, effective January 
24, 1972, applies to injuries occurring after that date. 
2 Locke, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1971 ANN. SuR . MAss. LAw, § 4.1 
at 50. 
3 Bulpett v. Dodge Assoc., Inc., 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1000, 365 
N.E.2d 1248 (per Keville, J.). 
4 Poirier v. Town of Plymouth, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 372 N.E.2d 212, 
(per Liacos, J. ) . 
5 300 Mass. 565, 16 N.E.2d 57 (1938)(per Lummus, J. 
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shadow . . . a cause of action for negligence causing a compen-
sable personal injury cannot grow .... 6 
Since section 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 7 does not apply 
unless work performed by an independent contractor or subcontractor 
is a "part of or process in" the work of the common employer, the de-
fense explicitly does not apply where the work performed is "merely 
ancillary and incidental to" a principal contractor's business.8 Much 
litigation has revolved around the question whether a given contract 
falls on one side or the other of this line. Such cases arise not only 
in connection with the common employment defense, but also in con-
nection with claims for compensation by employees of uninsured con-
tractors. "The process of decision is largely dependent upon an analysis 
of the facts of the business enterprise in question, although factual 
precedents have emerged in cases dealing with construction and repair 
and with transportation." n 
Although ordinarily the existence of common employment is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, the Bulpett court stated that where the circum-
stances of a particular case indicate that the independent contractor or 
subcontractor's work is plainly part of the principal contractor's busi-
ness, then the question is one of law and should not be submitted to 
the jury.10 In both Bulpett and Poirier the courts felt that the sub-
contractor's work was plainly a part of or process in the principal em-
ployer's work. 
In Bulpett, two workers were seriously injured in falls from two 
"buckets" of an hydraulic aerial mechanism called a sky-worker when 
the boom suspending the buckets collapsed. Bulpett was employed as 
an electrician by an electrical contractor engaged in the erection and 
insulation of a power sub-station for the Boston Edison Company. The 
accident occurred when the steel piston rod holding the upper boom 
of the sky-worker aloft pulled out of the aluminum block into which 
it was screwed. 11 Bulpett' s action was brought for negligence against 
Dodge Associates, Inc., owner of the sky-worker, among other defend-
ants. At the trial evidence was introduced as to the negligence of a 
maintenance man employed by Dodge, and the jury returned a verdict 
G Id. at 568-69, 16 N.E.2d at 58. The common employment doctrine is de-
scribed in detail in L. LocKE, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION, 29 Mass. Prac. § 663-
665 (1968). 
7 G.L. c. 152, § 18. 
s LocKE, supra note 6, § 664.3 at 788. 
n Id. The cases and the rules emerging from them are discussed at id., §§ 154 
& 155. 
1o 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1003, 365 N.E.2d at 1250. 
11 Id. at 1000-01, 365 N.E.2d at 1249. 
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against Dodge in favor of Bulpett.12 On Dodge's appe 1 the only issue 
raised was whether it was error for the judge to deny Dodge's motion for 
a directed verdict on the basis of the common employment defense.13 
Dodge contended that as a matter of law it was engagedfin common em-
ployment with the electrical contractor. The court acce ted this conten-
tion.14 The court said, "Dodge furnished a specialized form of vehicle 
and an operator to Foster [the electrical contractor] for use on a con-
struction project, and the operator worked under the general direction 
of a Foster supervisor .... [T]he operation of the s3-worker was an 
integral part of the . . . work." 11' The court held th cases cited by 
the plaintiff to be inapposite, stating, "In none of thes cases were the 
plaintiffs 'plainly' engaged in work that was 'part of or process in' the 
defendant's normal business." 16 
In Poirier, the plaintiff was employed by an indepefdent contractor 
engaged by the Town of Plymouth to paint the defend nt's water tank. 
He was climbing the tank on a stationary ladder affix d to one of its 
supporting legs and was thrown about thirty-five feet to the ground 
while attempting to continue his climb by going up a second ladder 
suspended from the top of the tankP Based on el" dence that the 
Town had failed to disclose hidden or conce~led defect on its premises 
which it either knew or should have known existed fr m the exercise 
of reasonable care, the jury found for the plaintiff for $60,000.18 This 
verdict was set aside by the Appeals Court,19 but the Supreme Judicial 
Court reinstated the verdict.20 This decision is prim~rily of interest 
because of its precedent-setting holding that the hidde defect rule is 
no longer to be applied in cases involving tort actio s against land-
owners. In reaching this decision, however, the Court had to address 
the defendant's contention that the judge should have submitted the 
case to the jury on the common employment issue. fe Court con-
sidered the crucial question whether the work carried n by the plain-
tiff was "merely ancillary" to the business carried on by e Town Water 
Dept. Citing Locke, Workmen's Compensation, section 154 at 188 
(1968), the Court noted that "maintenance and repair work 'which [is] 
required only occasionally and involve[s] extensive al erations or the 
12 Id. at 1001, 365 N.E.2d at 1249-50. 
13 Id. at 1002, 365 N.E.2d at 1250. 
H Id. at 1003-05, 365 N.E.2d at 1250-51, discussing McFadden v. W.J. Hal-
loran Co., 338 Mass. 189, 192, 154 N.E.2d 582, 584 (1958); Pettiti v. McHugh, 
341 Mass. 566, 570-71, 171 N.E.2d 169, 171-72 (1960); Campinha v. James J. 
Devine, Inc., 1 Mass. App. 482, 483, 301 N.E.2d 459, 460 ( 1971). 
11> 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1004-05, 365 N.E.2d at 1251. 
16 Id. at 1005, 365 N.E.2d at 1251. 
17 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 100, 372 N.E.2d at 216-17. 
18 Id., 372 N.E.2d at 217. 
1o 4 Mass. App. 665, 357 N.E.2d 336 (1976). 
20 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 127, 372 N.E.2d at 228. 
29
Locke: Chapter 4: Workmen's Compensation Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1978
§4.7 WORKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW 111 
serviCmg of specialized equipment beyond the competence of [the in-
sured employer's] regular staff, may be found to be 'merely ancillary 
and incidental' to the business of the insured employer.' " 21 The Court 
reasoned that the work of sanding and grinding rough spots and paint-
ing a water tank at a height of between 35 and 50 feet obviously calls 
for a specially equipped crew and is easily distinguishable from the type 
of routine painting of hydrants and pipes, painting over grafitti, and 
other maintenance carried on by the defendant's own employees.22 On 
this basis, the Court concluded that it could not be found that the 
plaintiff's work constituted a "branch or department" of the defendant's 
business of selling and distributing water to Plymouth customers, and 
the judge did not err in deciding this question as a matter of law. The 
Court stated, "[The question] is one of law where the record supports 
the conclusion either that the work plainly is, or plainly is not, part of 
the principal employer's trade or business."23 
Little would be gained in these pages to analyze in further detail the 
detailed fact patterns which might be considered to distinguish Bulpett 
from Poirier and thereby to explain the different results-that in Poirier, 
the ruling of a trial judge to keep the issue from the jury was upheld, 
whereas in Bulpett, the determination of a jury on special question that 
the work of Dodge Associates was similarly merely ancillary and in-
cidental was overturned by the Appeals Court as "plainly" within the 
common employment. The law that defined or sought to define the 
distinction between work which was "part of or process in" the work 
of the general employer and work which was ancillary and incidental 
to the general employer's work, and the further law which sought to 
define which situations were matters of fact for the jury and which 
were matters of law for the court was "beset with distinctions so delicate 
that chaos is the consequence." 24 No lawyer could say with assurance 
when a court would find the work to be "part of or process in," or 
"ancillary and incidental." This confusion and unpredictability was one 
of the reasons for the action of the legislature in abolishing the common 
employment defense. Fortunately, courts will not be plagued, nor liti-
gants burdened, much longer with the inequities and confusions of the 
common employment defense. 
§4.7. Legislation. Although the cases discussed in this chapter relate 
to the Survey year, June 1, 1977, through May 31, 1978, the legislative 
changes discussed are those enacted by the Massachusetts General Court 
during the legislative year of 1978. 
21 Id. at 114, 372 N.E.2d at 222. 
22 Id. at 115, 372 N.E.2d at 222. 
23 Id. 
24 Cardozo, A Ministry of justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 121 ( 1921). 
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A. BENEFIT PAYMENTS 
Where an employee dies as a result of a compensable m]ury, the 
benefits paid to his dependents under section 31 are not based on a 
percentage of his average weekly wages, as in the c*se of incapacity 
compensation; rather they are a "pension" at a set r~te, regardless of 
the income level of the wage earner. The benefits have been notoriously 
low: $45 per week from November 29, 1970, to October 31, 1974, and 
$55 per week from November 1, 1974, to November 1, 1978. The benefits 
have now been raised to $110 weekly by chapter 46~ of the Acts of 
1978, effective for injuries occurring on or after Nove~ber 1, 1978. An 
additional $6 is added for each dependent child as defined in section 32 
of the Act. The total amount of payments under section 31 shall not be 
more than $32,000 nor be continued for more than 400 weeks, with the 
provision, however, that benefits shall be paid beyond te $32,000 maxi-
mum if the Board finds that a widow is not, in fact, full self-supporting. 
A similar provision is now also made for a widower.1 rior to the 1978 
amendment, the maximum amount payable to a dependent spouse was 
$16,000. 
Chapter 461 also increased the benefits payable to othbr persons totally 
or partially dependent upon the deceased worker. T~e weekly benefit 
was based on a percentage of the weekly wages, but subject to a modes-t 
$40 maximum and $24 minimum. The aggregate maximum was in-
creased from $8,500 to $17,000. In a further amendmrnt applicable to 
death cases, chapter 424 of the Acts of 1978 increased the burial allot-
ment from the previous limit of $1,000 to a more re~sonable amount 
of $2,000, effective July 13, 1978. 
Chapter 474 of the Acts of 1976 had provided that while an employee 
is totally incapacitated he shall be paid a weekly cotpensation equal 
to two-thirds of his average weekly wage but, for c ses arising after 
October 1, 1978, not more than 100% of the average weekly wage in 
the commonwealth as determined by the Division of Employment Secur-
ity. In accordance with this provision, the maximum under section 34 
of the Act for temporary total disability for the year b~ginn.ing October 
1, 1978 has been set at $211.37 per week. This is a~fo the maximum 
permitted under section 35 for pa1tial incapacity, and section 34A for 
permanent and total incapacity. However, chapter 474 had set the 
maximum for all benefits under section 34 and sectio 35 at $45,000. 
This represents only 213 weeks of compensation at th maximum rate. 
§4.7. 1 There was a substantial question as to whether the previous differentia-
tion in favor of a widow, to the disparagement of a widower, was constitutional 
under the recent Equal Rights Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. 
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Consider the history: 2 when the maximum was set at $25 per week 
b~ck in 1946, the aggregate maximum was $10,000.3 When the maxi-
mum was raised to $30 in 1949, the aggregate maximum was retained 
at $10,000 reducing the number of weeks for which compensation was 
payable to 333.33 weeks.4 On December 13, 1955, the weekly maximum 
was raised to $35, but the aggregate maximum was retained at $10,000.5 
This reduced the number of weeks to 285.71. On January 15, 1959, the 
maximum was raised to $40, and again the maximum amount was re-
tained at $10,000,u bringing to 250 the number of weeks for which the 
maximum benefits could be paid. Although 250 weeks became the 
norm after November 1, 1972, another thirteen years of varying rates 
and varying maximums remained before this norm was set at so low a 
level. On December 7, 1959, when the rate was increased to $45, the 
maximum went to $14,000, or 311.11 weeks.7 On August 29, 1961, the 
rate was increased to $50 and the maximum to $16,000, or 320 weeks.8 
The $16,000 limit remained until November 1, 1971. For two years 
prior to that, the maximum was $70, or only 228.57 weeks.9 When the 
rate was increased to $77 on November 1, 1971, the maximum was in-
creased to $20,000,10 or 259.74 weeks, but the $20,000 was retained 
when, on November 1, 1972, the maximum was set at $80,11 or the 
magic multiple of 250 weeks. This multiple has been retained until 
the current year, when for the first time again it has fallen below, to 
the remarkably short period of 213 weeks. Legislative action is re-
quired to increase the overall maximum so that benefits will not be 
cut off in the middle of a period of medical treatment, convalescence 
or vocational rehabilitation, as will be the fate of many persons subject 
to this limit. 
Another restrictive feature of the 1976 Act is now becoming manifest. 
Additional dependency compensation is allowed up to $150 weekly for 
employees whose weekly compensation is below that amount.12 One 
hundred and fifty dollars was the maximum weekly benefit for all 
employees for the year immediately preceding October 1, 1978.13 When 
2 See L. LocKE, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION, 29 Mass. Prac. § 301 ( 1968) 
(hereinafter cited as LocKE). 
3 Acts of 1946, c. 321, §§ 1, 4. 
4 Acts of 1949, c. 520, § l. 
5 Acts of 1955, c. 777, § l. 
6 Acts of 1958, c. 665, § l. 
7 Acts of 1959, c. 566, § l. 
s Acts of 1961, c. 602, § l. 
9 Acts of 1969, c. 529. 
10 Acts of 1971, c. 879, § 4. 
11 Id. 
12 Acts of 1976, c. 474, § 11. 
13 Id. §§ 3, 4, 8. 
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the maximum was increased to $211.37, however, the cut-off for de-
pendency was kept at $150. Employees entitled to compensation over 
$150 get no additional dependency compensation. Again, legislative 
amendment is needed to overcome this defect. I 
I 
B. PROCEDURAL AMENDMENTS I 
Prior to the enactment of chapter 348 of the Acts lof 1978, a party 
had only ten days in which to claim a review of a decifion of the single 
member under section 10 14 or enter a decision of the reviewing board 
in the superior court under section 11 for judicial review or enforce-
ment.1" The 1978 amendment extended the time from ten days to thirty 
days, a welcome relief to parties who no longer will have to scramble 
to meet the unduly short deadline. However, the period within which 
to request a hearing as a party aggrieved by an order ff a single mem-
ber following a conference under section 7 is still ke t at ten days.16 
A similar modification is required to extend that peri d also to thirty 
days. · · , 
By chapter 424 of the Acts of 1978, the Industrial ~ccident Board is 
empowered to rule on claims for attorneys' fees and medical services 
at a conference under section 7, but only in cases which have previously 
been determined to be compensable under the Act. The, power has not 
been extended in cases where liability is an issue. 
C. CosT oF LIVING ADJUSTMENT l 
Under the Massachusetts Compensation Act, the d te of injury gov-
erns the rate of compensation benefits.17 No provisio is made in the 
Massachusetts Act, comparable to that introduced into he laws of many 
other states, to adjust the weekly benefit in accordan e with increases 
in the cost of living. Such amendments have been presented to the 
legislature for many years under a variety of schemes, but have con-
tinuously been rejected. The present focus on inflation might well 
provide a more favorable environment in which to accomplish this long 
overdue improvement in the compensation act. The present system 
merely forces employees and their survivors to bear u~ided the ravages 
of inflation, or to resort to charity or public welfare. e burden should 
not be thus shifted from the insurance carrier, conside ing the fact that 
under workmen's compensation the insured person h s been deprived 
of a common law remedy for his injuries. 
H Acts of 1972, c. 742, § 4, amending G.L. c. 152, § 10. 
15 Id. § 5, amending G.L. c. 152, § 11. 
1 6 G.L. c. 152, § 7, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 974 and Acts of 1972, c. 
742, § 1. 
17 Steuterman's Case, 323 Mass. 454, 82 N.E.2d 601 (1948); LocKE, supra 
note 2, § 302 at 358. 
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